Cultural relativism versus moral objectivity

This post is a slightly modified version of a paper I wrote for my ethics class this semester.

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Before taking ethics I was sure that my own thinking lined up with cultural relativism; the belief that there is no greater right or wrong beyond what we are taught by society -- that morality is relative to each culture, and an action can only be deemed right or wrong within the context of a cultural set of morals. After reading on the topic for ethics, and encountering it in other classes this semester, I am now far more convinced of moral objectivity. There are a lot of problems with investing belief in strict cultural relativism. When approaching issues of human rights, we should adopt a practical concept of an objective moral code that can be applied cross-culturally.

    There are many times when a cultural relativist view is beneficial. In anthropology, it is used to study cultures without bias. Overall it is important to understand that no one culture is better than another. When it comes to morality, however, it can be dangerous to think this way. It is understandable that, especially in the U.S. and Europe, people are reluctant to criticize other cultures. This seems to be a product of “white guilt”; we don’t want to repeat the sins of our ancestors by dictating how other people live. But as James Rachels points out in his article “The Challenge of Culture Relativism” there are serious inconsistencies when we apply this thought to morality. Americans regularly condemn their history of slavery as morally wrong (as we should). This judgment does not comply with cultural relativism. America circa 1800 is inarguably a distinct culture from our culture, current day America, just distinct in time instead of space. We haven’t been immersed in that culture, but most of us are quick to make moral judgments about it. By this same logic, we should be able to look at other cultures, distinct in space or time or both, and make moral judgments. Of course, we should be cautious about these judgments because there may be misunderstandings. One good example, mentioned in Rachels’s article, is the Inuit practice of infanticide. Inuit parents can only manage to care for one totally dependent child at a time. If another child is born before the last is more self-reliant, it will be killed. Upon closer examination we can see that this is a necessity for the survival of the whole group; it is not something that the Inuits want to do, it is simply necessary for the greater good.

    One common criticism of moral objectivity is the fact that if there were a universal code of morals all cultures should be making progress toward convergence on it, in the same way that we are beginning to converge on certain scientific truths. However I don’t think morality should be viewed in analogy to science or math; I disagree with the Platonic view that moral truth is woven into the universe and is there for us to discover. With this in mind, it makes sense that we haven’t “found” the moral truth yet; it isn’t there for us to find. I take a more constructivist approach that objective morality (and morality in general) is something we need to create -- and have naturally created -- to govern ourselves. In order for moral rules to be effective and meaningful, however, they need to be made and applied cross-culturally.

    Another criticism of moral objectivity is the simple fact that there is apparently a lot of variation in morality from culture to culture. This doesn’t have to mean that there is no standard for how we should act though. The variation could be explained by how morals came about in the first place. Thomas Hobbes theorized that moral rules are the result of a social compromise; they are necessary for a functioning society where no one gets everything they want, but no one is done terrible injustice either. I tend to agree with this view and see morality as a result of human evolution. With this in mind, it makes sense that different conditions lead to different moral rules in some cases. Going back to an earlier example, the infanticide of Inuit babies is necessary for the survival of the rest of the family and therefore not seen as wrong. Along these same lines, a lot of religious moral rules have been imposed as a way of unifying a group of people. As we grow toward a more technologically advanced and globalized world, some of these rules and practices become less necessary for our survival and therefore less morally permissible.

    Regardless of whether there actually exists a single truth of universal morality, I think that there are certain ways in which we all should and should not act, and this is how I define moral objectivity. These standards would be defined by humans so would be constantly under revision. Even if they are not perfect, we should still have standards of right and wrong action. Defining a universal moral code is tricky, but I ascribe to the Kantian view: basically, the golden rule. If you wouldn’t want something to be done to you, don’t do it or let it be done to other people. This guideline can more or less be applied to any culture. In Mary Midgley’s article, “Trying Out One’s New Sword,” she discusses the ancient Japanese tradition of a samurai testing the sharpness of his sword by attempting to bisect (and kill) a random passerby. Midgley points out that we can’t know how the subject of one of these attacks feels about their fate. Even though this is a culturally acceptable practice — in the samurai’s view at least — it’s hard to believe that the victims are fine with being sliced in half. If the samurais switched roles with their test subjects, they would probably view it quite differently.

    Humans are gifted with empathy by such psychological processes as mirror neurons, that allow us to feel both the pain and the happiness of other people as if it were our own. This remarkable ability should be used to determine what is right and wrong in our dealings with others through the well known “golden rule.” Whether or not morality is even “real” outside of human experience, we should make an effort to not inflict harm on each other. Something such as the UN Doctrine of Human Rights is a good example of how we can construct a kind of moral objectivity that isn’t abstract and meta, but down to earth and practical. Adhering to a strict view of cultural relativism would not allow this kind of international cooperation, because it assumes that no culturally-approved practice can be wrong; that there is no right and wrong outside of a single culture. A practical view of moral objectivity is superior because it allows us to overcome oppression and secure human rights for everyone.